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IS A DECLARATION OF SUBSCRIPTION "RIGHTS" REVOCABLE?
The recent case of Hugo Cohn v. Cities Service Company'
presents the novel and important question of the revocability of
share purchase "rights" declared by the board of directors and
announced to the shareholders. In the form of a hypothetical
ease, the facts were substantially these:
On October 10, 1929, Corporation C, acting through its board
of directors, notified its shareholders by letter that each share-
holder of record on November 7, 1929 would be entitled to "sub-
scribe" to one non-par common share at $45 for each ten shares
then registered in his name, this "right" to expire on November
30, 1929; that as soon as practicable after November 7, 1929
"warrants" would be mailed to each shareholder specifying the
number of shares to which he was entitled to subscribe; and that
the "rights" evidenced by such warrants would be transferable
I U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y., January 23, 1930.
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by assignment duly executed in the form printed thereon. At
the time of this announcement the authorized but unissued capi-
tal stock of C was greater than the number of shares thus offered
for subscription, 2 and in all other respects the corporation had
power to issue the shares contemplated by its announcement.
On October 14, 1929 Corporation C also had outstanding a large
number of Gold Debenture bonds, to each of which was attached
a non-detachable stock purchase warrant entitling the holder
thereof, upon presentation of the warrant and $31.50, to become
a holder of record of one common share thirty days thereafter.
On that date C published advertisements in papers in numerous
large cities, stating that if the debenture holders would present
their warrants at any time between October 16, 1929 and Novem-
ber 4, 1929, accompanied by cash payment for the shares called
for by the warrants, the thirty day clause would be waived and
the debenture holders would be recorded on November 7, 1929, as
holders of the shares called for by the warrants, and thus en-
titled to the "rights" theretofore offered to shareholders, as well
as to participate in the December 1, 1929 dividend.
On October 10, 1929 the market value of shares of C was con-
siderably above $45; but late in October a violent break in
prices of all securities occurred, and on October 30, 1929, the
market price of shares of C being then considerably below $45,
the board of directors of C notified the shareholders by letter
that the proposal of October 10, 1929 was withdrawn. The
"rights" had been traded in on the New York Curb Market at
prices ranging from $1.50 to $2.25 per "right."
The plaintiff was a shareholder who had sold his "rights" prior
to this revocation (whether he acquired his shares before or after
the announcement of the "rights" on October 10, 1929 and
whether or not he retained his shares when selling his "rights"
do not appear). There were two intervenors, each of whom had
bought debenture bonds after the advertisements on October 14,
1930, had exercised the warrants attached to such bonds, and had
sold the "rights" which would thereby have accrued to them on
November 7, 1929, if the proposal had not been withdrawn. The
plaintiff (and the intervenors) sought to enjoin the defendant
corporation from nullifying the "rights" granted to its share-
holders and to compel it to leave open the proposals of October
10, 1929 and October 14, 1929. The action was instituted prior
to November 7, 1929. Having sold their "rights," the parties
plaintiff were interested not in exercising such "rights" but in
being able to deliver on November 7, 1929 to their purchasers
2 The authorized capital stock of Cities Service Company consisted, in
addition to certain preferred shares, of 50,000,000 common shares of no
par value of which only 22,270,544 common shares were outstanding at the
time this action was commenced.
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that which they had sold for future delivery, to wit, warrants
evidencing "rights" to subscribe for shares at $45 per share.3
In dismissing the bill, the court, per Bondy, J., held that the
plaintiff's remedy, if any, was an action at law for money dam-
ages; the court expressly refused to consider whether the de-
benture holders might have an action to recover the warrants
they had deposited with the corporation and the money they had
paid it, since the present suit was based upon an affirmance, and
such action would proceed on the theory of a disaffirmance, of
the agreement.
This comment is concerned only with those legal controversies
in which the corporation is a potential litigant, arising out of the
proposal of "rights" and its withdrawal; controversies between
the purchasers and sellers of shares and/or rights are expressly
excluded from present consideration,4 except insofar as they may
indirectly affect matters here discussed.
The Proposal of "Rights" as an Offer
A possible approach to the problems in hand is from the
standpoint of general principles of the law of contracts. From
this angle the first question to be considered would be whether
or not Corporation C's announcement on October 10, 1929 was an
"offer," and if so, to whom and of what. It might be maintained
that the corporation's proposal to issue "warrants" to share-
holders of record on November 7, 1929 was merely a statement
of its present intention and not an act which, at least prior to
November 7, 1929, created any powers or other legal relations
3 Since the risk of impossibility of enforcement of the "rights" is not upon
the buyer (see note 4 infra), it is conceded that the revocation releases him
from the duty of paying the agreed purchase price to the seller; but if the
corporation had not revoked the "rights," the seller would be entitled to
the full purchase price, as the risk of the "rights" becoming less valuable,
or even worthless, by a break in the market is, of course, upon the .buyer.
4 Controversies are not likely to arise between the purchasers and sellers
of "rights," despite the revocation, because such transactions are custom-
arily on a "when, as and if issued" basis. This means that both parties
agree that if the shares cannot be created, the status quo is to be restored,
i. e., the purchaser'then has a right to recover whatever he may have paid
in advance for the "rights" and no duty to pay the remainder of the price,
and the seller is not responsible in damages to the purchaser for breach of
contract. The reason why these transactions are usually on a "when, as
and if issued" basis is not because the parties anticipate the possibility of
revocation of the "rights" (heretofore revocation has been practically un-
heard of), but because many other things may intervene to prevent the
creation of the shares contemplated in the "rights," e. 9. the corporation
might become bankrupt, or its "existence" terminated by quo warranto, or
a disability to create the shares might develop (the requisite consent of a




as to other parties. This might be a reasonable interpretation
if the announcement had contained any reservations as to with-
drawal or conditions as to the fulfillment of its apparent prom-
ises. If there is a present condition precedent to power to create
shares, such as consent of a Blue Sky Commission or an amend-
ment of the articles of association or enabling legislation, con-
tracts by corporations with underwriters and others for the fut-
ure creation of shares are usually expressly upon a "when, as
and if issued" basis. Under similar circumstances an announce-
ment of "rights" to shareholders would, in the normal case, be
expressly stated to be conditional or subject to withdrawal.
But when, as here, the shares which will be created by the
exercise of the announced "rights" are part of the authorized
but unissued capital stock of the corporation and there is present
power to create them, the corporation having no need to safe-
guard itself, such announcements (or offers) are not stated as
being in any way conditional. So to interpret this unconditional
promise of the corporation as to convert it into a mere illusion
of an offer is surely warranted neither by custom nor equity.,
The Irrevocability of an Offer of "Rights" from the Time
of its Publication
Authorities in the field of contract law regard an offer as a
promise.6 It is a familiar rule of the law of contracts that cer-
tain promises are enforceable from the moment of communica-
tion to the promisee." The question here presented is whether
the corporation's promise of "rights" is similarly enforceable.
The closest analogy which at once presents itself is that of an
announced declaration by a corporation of a cash dividend to be.
paid out of an existing surplus. It is well settled that the com-
munication to a shareholder of the declaration of a lawful cash
dividend on his shares at once creates a right in him to such divi-
dend, and that neither a subsequent revocation by the directors
5 It is, of course, possible to interpret Corporation C's announcement not
as obligating it to create additional shares as to those shareholders of rec-
ord on November 7, 1929 who tender C $45 per share, but as obligating
it merely to create such shares as to such shareholders, if it creates any
shares as to anyone on that date. While this would not be so interpreting
C's announcement as to constitute it an "illusory offer," the interpretation
would be so far-fetched and would so radically change the apparent terms
of the offer as expressed' as not to seem even plausible.
6 See CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 24: "An offer is a
promise which is in its terms conditional upon an act, forbearance or return
promise being given in exchange for the promise or its perfornance .... "
7 For instance, a promise to pay a debt of the promisor outlawed by
a statute of limitations (see CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 86), or a promise
to pay a debt of the promisor discharged in bankruptcy proceedings (see
CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 87).
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nor his failure to show a change of position in reliance on the
dividend terminates this right.8 It will be observed that such a
promise of cash dividends is thus enforceable from the moment
of its communication to the shareholders. The real reasons for
this rule do not appear in the cases enunciating it or in commen-
taries thereon.9 Possibly the rule originated in the thought that
a declaration of a cash dividend out of an existing surplus is so
nearly "cash in hand" that an expectant shareholder is very likely
to change his position, to make commitments, in reliance there-
on, and that therefore the court will assume such a change of
position in every case, without any proof thereof.
The announcement of a proposal by the board of directors to
capitalize surplus and to pay a share dividend is said, on the
other hand, not to constitute an enforceable promise, and a subse-
quent resolution of the board revoking the previous declaration
is alleged to have the effect of terminating or precluding rights
in the shareholders to the share dividend originally declared.10
This distinction between cash dividends and share dividends is,
however, founded upon only two cases, neither of which is
persuasive."' The rationale most frequently offered for the dis-
8 McLaran v. Crescent Planing Mill Co., 117 Mo. App. 40, 93 S. W. 819
(1906); Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Carlson, 116 Minn. 438, 133
N. W. 1014 (1912); Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 (1875):
BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) § 157; MACHEN, MODER. LAv
OF CORPORATIONS (1908) § 1358; MORAWETZ, PRnATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1886) § 445; TAYLOR, LAW OF PRIVATE COR 0ATIONS (5th ed. 1902) § 56[-;
THouPsoN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5275. See Ford v. East-
hampton Rubber Thread Co., 158 Mass. 84, 32 N. E. 1036 (1893); Le Roy
v. Globe Insurance Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 656 (N. Y., 1836); King v. Patterson &
Hudson River R. R., 29 N. J. L. 82 (1860). Compare Searles v. Gebbie,
115 App. Div. 778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199 (4th Dep't 1906); Wheeler v. North-
western Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1889); Plant v. Walsh,
280 Fed. 722 (D. Conn. 1922).
9 The two reasons most frequently assigned are (1) that the declaration
of a cash dividend is an acknowledgment of a debt due from the corpora-
tion to its shareholders, irrevocably creating a debtor-creditor relationship
from the moment of the declaration; and (2) that upon the declaration and
announcement of the dividend and the setting apart of a fund for its pay-
ment a trust is created with respect to the fund in favor of the share-
holders. Compare McLaran v. Crescent Planing Mill Co. with Ford v.
Easthampton Rubber Thread Co., both supra note 8. Such statements are
mere rephrasings of the result and not reasons for it.
1 B-LLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 157; MIACHEN, op. Cit. cupra note
8, at § 601; TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 568; THOmPSON, op. cit.
supra note 7, at § 5276.
12 Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., 47 Conn. 141 (1879) ; Staats v. Biograph Co.,
236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
In the Terry ease the pertinent facts were: on August 5, 1875, at a time
when the then authorized capital stock of the defendant corporation was
entirely outstanding, the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting passed a
resolution authorizing an increase of 2000 shares in the authorized capital
stock and directing the directors to create such increase pro rata as to the
19301 1167
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then existing shareholders. The board of directors took no action with refer-
ence to this resolution and no further steps were taken to amend the
articles of association so as to increase the authorized capital stock pursuant
to the resolution, no certificate of increase being filed in the office of the
secretary of state, etc. On August 18, 1875 at another shareholders' meet-
ing a vote was passed rescinding the resolution of August 5th. Almost a
year later, during which interval over 1400 shares had changed hands, the
petitioner instituted this action inter alia for his proportion of the increase
in authorized capital stock voted August 5th or its equivalent in cash. In
dismissing the bill the court, per Carpenter, J., emphasized the laches of the
petitioner and the fact that the vote of August 5th was merely the first
step in converting surplus earnings into shares. Park, C. J. and Pardee, J.,
while concurring in the result, expressed the opinion that "the corporation
had no right to revoke the stock dividend which was voted on the 5th
of August, 1875."
It would seem obvious from these facts that the case is not authority for
the proposition that a share dividend, properly declared, may be revoked.
Normally, the declaration of any dividend is exclusively within the author-
ity of the board of directors. For this and other reasons the majority of
the court do not appear to have regarded the shareholders' resolution in
question as a declaration of a share dividend; even if the resolution be re-
garded as a declaration of a share dividend, which, it will be noted, the
corpoiation was at the time of the resolution powerless to carry out, the
decision adverse to the petitioner is based upon his delay in attacking the
resolution and not upon a general principle of revocability of share divi-
dends properly declared.
The pertinent facts of the Staats case were: on December 28, 1914, at a
time when all but 10 shares of the then authorized capital stock of 20,000
shares was outstanding, the board of directors of the defendant corpora-
tion declared a 50 per cent dividend payable February 1, 1915 to share-
holders of record January 18, 1915; this dividend was to be paid in regis-
tered scrip certificates that might be converted on or before December 31,
1916 into cash or shares at par at the option of the corporation. On August
10, 1915, before any portion of the scrip dividend had been paid, the direc-
tors rescinded the dividend; the shareholders were informed of this rescis-
sion on August 26, 1915. On September 14, the plaintiff demanded of the
defendant corporation that proportion of the registered scrip certificates
to which he would have been entitled had the resolution of December 28,
1914 not been rescinded. The demand was not complied with and plaintiff
thereupon instituted this suit to recover $27,500, that being 50/ of the
par value of the shares held by him. At all times subsequent to December
28, 1914, the corporation had a surplus greater than 50% of the total par
value of its outstanding shares. All of the shareholders except the plaintiff
had acquiesced in the action of the directors rescinding the resolution of
December 28, 1914, the rescission having been induced by the unanticipated
extent to which the war adversely affected the corporation's business. In
a very poorly presented opinion the court, per Rogers, J., affirmed the Dis-
trict court decree, directing a verdict for defendant. It is impossible to
ascertain from the opinion the reasons relied on by the court for this re-
sult. The court seems to have been influenced largely by three considera-
tions: (1) that the corporation reserved the option of paying the dividend
in shares and that as it had no power to create the shares without a subse-
quent amendment of its articles increasing its authorized capital stock, the
whole matter rested "in fieri;" (2) that this was not a bill in equity specif-
ically to compel the issuance of the scrip certificates, but an action at law
for damages which would be at most merely nominal; and (3) that the
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tinction is that in the payment of a cash dividend a corporation
parts with a portion of its assets, whereas the payment of a share
dividend is merely a corporate book-keeping transaction leaving
its assets undiminished (funds formerly labelled surplus will
thereafter be designated as capital) ; 22 that the declaration of a
cash dividend is in effect a promise to the shareholders of a cash
payment within a comparatively short time, whereas the declara-
tion of a share dividend is merely an assurance by the directors
to the shareholders that the corporation is prospering and that
they hope to pay out a somewhat larger total amount of cash
dividends in the future than theretofore. One may concede all
these distinctions and nevertheless legitimately insist that they
constitute no valid reason for differentiating between cash divi-
dends and share dividends in so far as revocability is concerned.
Indeed, from the standpoint of change of position in reliance
upon the declaration, there would appear to be more justification
for holding a share dividend to be irrevocable than a cash divi-
dend, for "rights" to a share dividend will inevitably be bought
and sold immediately upon its declaration, if the shares are listed
on any recognized Exchange. Moreover, the fact that a cash
dividend diminishes the corporation's assets as a share divi-
dend does not, would seem to be a better reason for upholding
an attempt by the directors, in the honest exercise of their dis-
cretion, to revoke a cash dividend than a share dividend.
To maintain that a share dividend is merely a bookkeeping
transaction is 'to ignore realities; it is demonstrable that, all
other factors remaining the same, the declaration of a share
doctrine of anticipatory breach did not apply as there 'was no "contract"
to be breached.
The case has been severely criticized. See Note (1917) 15 MICH. L. R'.
432. At one stage in his opinion Judge Rogers clearly recognized the lack
of merit in the corporation's position by stating: "For we confess our in-
ability to see how the corporation or its stockholders could in the least de-
gree have been prejudiced if the scrip dividend had been issued as originally
voted, and the corporation had then elected to pay it in stock. The prop-
erty of the corporation would not have been impaired in the slightest
extent." 236 Fed. at 457-8. At best the case is only applicable to declara-
tions of share dividends at a time when the corporation's authorized capital
stock is all or virtually all outstanding.
'12 See, for example, Rogers, J. in Staats v. Biograph Co., -upra note 11,
at 462: "At most the damage caused [by a rescission of a share dividend)
would be nominal. If the defendant had performed, the complaint simply
would have had the number of his shares of stock increased and the value
of each share in the same proportion decreased." And Carpenter, J. in
Terry v. Eagle Lock Co., supra note 11, at 165: "A stock dividend is excep-
tional. It does not add to his [the shareholder] ready cash, but it changes
the form of his investment by increasing his number of shares, thereby
diminishing the value of each share, leaving the aggregate value of all his
stock substantially the same. It is of no special importance whether that
value be divided into few or many shares."
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dividend normally results in an appreciation of the shares out-
standing; furthermore, the payment of a share dividend at once
alters the shareholder's position by reducing the corporate funds
available for cash distribution,13 and in order to realize the cash
which he might formerly have received by way of a cash divi-
dend, the shareholder must sell some of his shares and thus de-
crease his proportionate interest in voting control and in assets
and net earnings.'
It should be noted that the revocability of a declaration of a
share dividend is not only unsupported by authority or by sound
reasoning, but that there is some authority in support of the ir-
revocability of such a declaration. In the case of Dock v.
Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 5 the defendant corporation, in ef-
fect, purchased 277 of its shares from the plaintiff out of surplus
(the corporation accepted the shares in payment of an indebted-
ness of the plaintiff to it at a time when it had a surplus larger
than the amount of the indebtedness) ; thereafter the directors
(to facilitate the sale of the entire assets of the corporation ap-
parently on a share for share basis) declared a dividend of 277
shares, these being the only portion of the 5,000 authorized
shares not then outstanding; the plaintiff as holder of 1500
shares would have been entitled to 89 of these shares, but the
negotiations for the sale of the corporate assets failed and the
directors revoked the share dividend; although the plaintiff had
parted with her 1500 shares after the declaration in question
(reserving her right to the 89 shares), in an action to compel the
corporation to create the 89 shares as to her she prevailed. Inas-
much as there is no sound legal distinction, for most purposes,
between so-called "treasury shares" and shares originally author-
ized but unissued,' this decision offers strong support for the
'3 A split-up of shares does not have this effect as it does not involve a
capitalization of surplus.
14 This difference between a cash dividend and a share dividend is fre-
quently neglected because of overemphasis of the fact that whether a given
amount of surplus is distributed as a cash dividend or capitalized by the
payment of a share dividend, the book-value of the shares outstanding at
the time of the dividend is decreased to the same extent by either form of
dividend.
Is 167 Pa. 370, 31 Atl. 656 (1895).
16 When a corporation, by forfeiture, donation or purchase, cancels some
of its outstanding shares, it does not in any normal sense become a share-
holder with respect to these shares, e. g. it may not vote the shares, or
collect dividends thereon, etc. Regardless of how the transaction may be
entered on the corporate books (unless it is a statutory reduction of author-
ized capital stock), the corporation acquires little more than a power to
create shares in lieu of those cancelled. If a corporation has an authorized
capital stock of 1000 shares of which 900 are outstanding, it has power
to create 100 shares; if the corporation had created 1000 shares, it would
have no power to create shares, but if 100 shares are then bought back by
or donated to the corporation, it will again have power to create 100 shares.
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proposition that a declaration of a share dividend is not neces-
sarily revocable.
Although it must be conceded that an offer of "rights" to sub-
scribe to new shares is not identical with a share dividend, the
difference is more formal than real. The subscription price, when
"rights" are offered to shareholders, is almost invariably less
than the prevailing market price and to that extent (if the
market price reflects the book value) the offer is in effect of a
share dividend. If the subscription price were zero dollars, the
offer would be of a share dividend, and the greater the difference
between the subscription 'price and the book value, the more
nearly the offer of "rights" approximates a share dividend. Even
when the subscription price of the "rights" is the full book value
of'the shares, it is difficult to justify the revocability of such
"rights" if once it is conceded that a declaration of a share
dividend out of surplus may be irrevocable.
The offer of "rights" is comparable to a conditional offer of
the shares to the shareholders, 7 the condition being the payment
of a stipulated amount per share (or the promise thereof) to the
corporation. If the unconditional offer of the shares would be
irrevocable, why should the attaching of a condition to the offer
render it revocable? The condition prevents the shareholder from
acquiring an immediate right to the shares until the condition is
fulfilled, but the fact that his right is conditional rather than un-
conditional would seem to have no necessary bearing upon the
power of the corporation to revoke. And from the standpoint of
possible change of position of the shareholders in reliance on the
offer, every reason supporting the irrevocability of a cash divi-
dend or of a share dividend would appear to apply to an offer of
"rights."
Thus, by analogy to the existing rule with respect to declara-
tions of dividends, it would appear that a declaration of "rights"
should be regarded as within the class of promises enforceable
from the moment of communication to the promisee without any
showing of change of position on his part in reliance thereon.
The economic desirability of such a rule, even in the absence of
A corporation cannot carry out a proposed share dividend, unless it has
power to create shares of that class and number; but in so far as the rev-
ocability of the dividend is concerned, the source of this power would
appear to be immaterial.
-- An offer by a corporation to its shareholders of "rights" to subscribe
to new shares at a stated price must be sharply distinguished from an offer
by the corporation to an outsider of shares at a stipulated price. An offer
of shares for no consideration to such an outsider would violate the rights
of existing shareholders, would be subject to injunction by them, and would
be revocable by the corporation without penalty; similarly an offer of
shares even at their reasonable market value to an outsider would be rev-
ocable at any time prior to acceptance (barring the question of possible
change of position considered hereafter).
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precedents or analogies, will be discussed in the remainder of
this comment.
The Irrevocability of arn Offer of "Rights" Resulting from
Subsequent Acts of Reliance
There is a general principle of the law of contracts that "a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on
the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise." 18 Does this rule apply to the instant
case? The rule is, of course, too broad and contains too many
variables to be self-explanatory; it is valuable, however, in that it
tells us that the law does recognize at least the possibility of a
promise becoming irrevocable as a result of a change in position
by the promisee in reasonable reliance thereon. The rule de-
limits the possible range of decision, but, as is always the fact
except in the obvious case, one must seek beyond the mere state-
ment of a rule of law for enlightenment as to the determination
of a particular controversy.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the irrevocability
of "rights" is the desirability of certainty in financial transac-
tions. Immediately and inevitably upon the announcement of
"rights," as in the case of a declaration of share dividends, trad-
ing in the "rights" will commence, especially when the corpora-
tion in no way intimates that its promise of "rights" is condi-
tional or subject to revocation.
The complexity of the situation also supports the irrevocability
of "rights." In the instant case the following classes of persons
are affected by the corporation's offers of October 10, 1929 and of
October 14, 1929 and its withdrawal on October 30, 1929:
(1) shareholders of record on October 10, 1929, who retained
both their shares and their "rights" at least until after October
30, 1929;
(2) shareholders of record on October 10, 1929, who sold their
shares and/or their "rights" prior to October 30, 1929;
(3) holders of debenture bonds on October 14, 1929, who re-
tained their bonds and their warrants at least until after Octo-
ber 30, 1929;
(4) holders of debenture bonds on October 14, 1929, who
exercised their warrants and thus became entitled to be share-
holders of record on November 7, 1929, and who may have re-
tained these "shares" and "rights" or sold the "shares" and/or
"rights ;"
is CoNmAcTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 90.
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(5) those who purchased shares and/or "rights" between Oc-
tober 10, 1929 and October 30, 1929;
(6) those who purchased debenture bonds between October
14, 1929 and October 30, 1929.
Of these persons the debenture bondholders who bought their
bonds (class 6) or who exercised their warrants (class 4) in
reliance on the advertisement of October 14, 1929, are the ones
who most obviously and materially changed their position in re-
liance on the corporation's offer of "rights." In varying degrees
all the other parties to these transactions may legitimately main-
tain that they, too, have changed their positions in reliance on
the offer of "rights," if only to the extent of not selling at favor-
able prices securities they otherwise would have sold.
Possibly none of these persons would be able to sustain the
burden of proving such a change in position as to render the cor-
poration's promise of "rights" irrevocable. Yet the aggregate
consequences of effective revocation cannot be ignored; the com-
plexity of the situation, and the high probability of injury to
many persons present a strong case in favor of irrevocability.
Finally, if the advantage to the corporation of revoking its
promise of "rights" is weighed against the detriment to its
shareholders (and others) of such action, the balance is heavily
in favor of irrevocability. The market value of its shares having
dropped below the subscription price stipulated in the "rights,"
the possibility is nil of anyone demanding shares at the subscrip-
tion price even if warrants had been issued on November 7, 1929
as promised. One can readily visualize personal advantages to
those corporate officials who brought about the revocation, if
they had contracted to buy "rights" upon future delivery, which
"rights" the break in the market had rendered worthless. If the
power of a corporation to revoke "rights" is upheld, it enables
corporate directors to speculate in "rights" with entire safety: if
the market value of the shares goes up and the "rights" become
more valuable in consequence, they can sell the "rights" and
realize a profit; if the market value goes down and the "rights"
depreciate below the price they agreed to pay, they can avoid
their obligations by revoking the "rights" and thereby disabling
the seller from performing. Conversely, if the directors have sold
"rights" short instead of buying them, they can avoid loss, by
revoking the "rights" if the market value goes up. Surely no
legitimate argument for revocation is to be found in such a heads-




AUTHORITY OF "CUSTOMERS' MAN" TO RECEIVE NOTICE REVOKING
POWER OF DISCRETIONARY TRADING
The recent New York case of Bosak v. Parrish 1 presents an in-
teresting problem arising out of the modern stock exchange
transaction. In legal terms, the case involves a question of
agency law; regarded more broadly from the results to be
reached, the question is one of determining upon which of two
parties a particular risk existing in the course of their dealing
shall fall. More specifically, does the stockbroker, or does the
customer, bear the risk of defalcation by the "customers' man"
who acts as their intermediary in trading transactions?
It appeared that the plaintiff was solicited to open a margin
account with the defendant stockbroker by a friend who was
employed as a "customers' man" of the defendant. The plaintiff
knew that the "customers' man" had been operating profitable
"discretionary accounts" 2 and having decided to let the "custo-
mers' man" "try his luck" 3 for him, opened such an account
with the defendant. He was required to execute a power of attor-
ney giving the employee in question complete discretionary
power of trading for the plaintiff's account.4 There was appar-
1252 N. Y. 212, 169 N. E. 280 (1929).
2 The term "discretionary account" in this comment refers to an account
operated by a "customers' man" of the broker. Strictly speaking, any ac-
count operated under a power of attorney is a discretionary account.
3 The Transcript of Record shows a conflict of testimony as to whether
this particular expression was used. Apparently however, it, or a phrase
of like import, was employed. See Transcript of Record 148, 149.
4 The power of attorney in its complete form was as follows:
Messrs. Parrish & Co.,
25 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.
Gentlemen:
This certifies that I have appointed and do hereby appoint George
Medinger my true and lawful attorney, for me and in my name, place and
stead, to buy and sell on margin or otherwise, through and with you as
my brokers, any and all manner of stocks, bonds and securities, dealt in on
the New York Stock Exchange or elsewhere, or to sell any of the same
short, and to receive and receipt for any and all moneys due me by reason
of such transactions and I hereby agree to make good any and all losses
resulting to you therefrom and to promptly pay the same upon demand.
Hereby giving and granting unto- my said attorney full power and
authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatever requisite
or necessary to be done in and about the premises as fully to all intents
and purposes as I might or could do if personally present myself. And I
hereby ratify and confirm all that my said attorney has done, may do, or
may cause to be done in the premises.
And this letter is your authority for fully recognizing the said George
Medinger as my attorney in all dealings with you.
Dated, August 4th, 1924.
Witness: Win. I. Zabriskie (Name) M. J. Bosak,
Address: Nyack, N. Y. (Address) 149 Fifth Avenue.
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ently an understanding between the plaintiff and the "customers'
man" by which the latter was to receive a share of any profits.
Nothing but losses resulted and upon receiving quarterly state-
ments showing such losses, the plaintiff notified the "customers'
man" to act henceforth only under specific orders, but did not so
notify the defendant firm., The "customers' man" continued to
trade independently and more losses appeared on the next quar-
terly statement. The plaintiff again pocketed his loss, again noti-
fied the clerk to cease his discretionary trading, but still said
nothing to the firm. The direction was likewise disregarded,
whereupon the plaintiff sued to recover the difference between
the balance left-in his account and the balance which would have
existed had there been no unauthorized transactions executed by
the defendant subsequent to the second notice. The Court of
Appeals took the view that the "customers' man" in receiving
the notice revoking his power of attorney was acting outside the
scope of his authority as the broker's agent and that the broker
was therefore not to be charged with notice of the revocation.
The court consequently reversed the Appellate Divisionj which
had sustained a verdict for the plaintiff entered by the trial court.
The precise issue raised by the principal case has apparently
not previously been before the Court of Appeals, but tvo earlier
decisions, one in the Appellate Division,8 and the other in the
New York Supreme Court,9 reached the opposite result on nearly
identical facts. Chief Judge Cardozo distinguished the previous
New York decisions as well as an early Illinois case 10 on the
ground that the employee in those cases was a branch manager
and hence was vested with sufficient "discretionary" 1 authority
to receive the notice of revocation on behalf of the firm." Of
5 There was a dispute as to this, but the dissent in the Appellate Division
argued for the result reached in the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
existence of such an understanding. See Bosak v. Parrish, 225 App. Div.
546, 552, 233 N. Y. Supp. 612, 618 (1st Dep't 1929).
6 It was argued by counsel for the defendant that the customer probably
did not notify even the "customers' man.' See Appellant's Brief 22-32. For
the purpose of the decision, however, it was assumed that there had been
such notice.7 Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 5.8 McConnell v. Hellwig, 190 App. Div. 244, 179 N. Y. Supp. 882 (2d Dep't
1920).
9 Eng v. Cammann, 85 Misc. 27, 147 N. Y. Supp. 23 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
20 Boyd v. Yerkes, 25 I1. App. 527 (1887).
1 See Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 1, at 213, 169 N. E. at 282.
121n the decision of the Appellate Division a dissenting opinion argued
for the same result by invoking the well-known agency rule that a principal
is not charged with the knowledge of his agent where it would be against
the interest of the agent to disclose his knowledge. This argument presup-
posed the existence of an agreement whereby the "customers' man" was
to receive a share of any profits resulting from a continuation of the ac-
count. See Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 5.
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course, the broad problem of determining upon whom to place the
risk of loss resulting from an intermediary's acts has presented
itself in several rather typical situations. It has probably ap-
peared most frequently in the litigation arising from mortgage-
loan 13 and insurance transactions.-4  And the same problem has
arisen when it has been necessary to determine whom to hold
responsible for the defalcation of an auctioneer,"5 a salesman, 0
a real estate agent,1 7 or a telegraph company.' 8 The question has
generally been considered to be simply one of agency law.19 At-
13Moore v. Blackburn, 67 Wash. 117, 120 Pac. 875 (1912); Lantry v.
Sutton, 22 N. Y. St. 244, 5 N. Y. Supp. 14 (1889); Cooper v. Headley, 12
N. J. Eq. 48 (1858); Bacot v. South Carolina Loan & Triust Co., 132 S. C.
340, 127 S. E. 562 (1925); Fair v. Bowen, 127 Mich. 411, 86 N. W. 991
(1901) ; Knox County v. Goggin, 105 Mo. 182, 16 S. W. 684 (1891) ; Thomas
v. Desney, 57 Iowa 58, 10 N. W. 315 (1881); Pepper v. Cairns, 133 Pa.
114, 19 AtI. 336 (1890); Sergeant v. Martin, 133 Pa. 122, 19 Atl. 568
(1890) ; Lipman v. Noblit, 194 Pa. 416, 45 Atl. 377 (1900) ; Land Mortgage
Co. v. Gillam, 49 S. C. 345, 26 S. E. 990 (1896); Englemann v. Reuse, 61
Mich. 395, 28 N. W. 149 (1886); Johnson v. Shattuck, 67 Ark. 159, 53 S.
W. 888 (1899); Sherwood v. Roundtree, 32 Fed. 113 (S. D. Ga. 1887);
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, 16 Colo. 515, 27 Pac. 807 (1891); Dupree v.
Coss Mortgage Co., 167 Ark. 18, 267 S. W. 586 (1924); Sterling Investment
Co. v. Hughes, 81 Okla. 79, 196 Pac. 933 (1921) ; Larson v. Lombard Invest-
ment Co., 51 Minn. 141, 53 N. W. 179 (1892).
14Kentucky Central Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Edmonson, 218 Ky. 825,
292 S. W. 511 (1927); Andrews v. Bulldog Auto Fire Ins. Ass'n, 291 S. W.
508 (Mo. 1927) ; Evans v. International Life Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 264, 252 Pac.
266 (1927); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac.
346 (1925); Fox v. Volunteer Life Ins. Co., 185 N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 266
(1923); Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 105 S. C. 305, 89 S. E. 675
(1916); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 Sup. Ct. 837
(1886); Ward v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 66 Conn. 227, 33 Atl. 902
(1895); Nixon v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 25 Wash. 254, 65 Pac. 195 (1901).
'5 White v. Dahlquist Mfg. Co., 179 Mass. 427, 60 N. E. 791 (1901).
1 Tremont v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.; 176 Minn. 294, 223 N. W.
137 (1929).
7 Jacks v. Manning, 297 S. W. 588 (Tex. 1927).
'8 Pepper v. Telegraph Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 783 (1889) ; cf. Brooke
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 Ga. 694, 46 S. E. 826 (1903).
'9 See 1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) 216. From this point of view,
the problem may be stated as that of determining "whose agent" an inter-
mediary is. Clearly he is the "agent" of one of two "principals" and a
decision may be arrived at by charging one or the other of the "principals"
with responsibility for the agent's acts. Cox v. Pearce, 112 N. Y. 637, 20
N. E. 566 (1889) ; Title Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Carpenter, 240 Mich. 319,
215 N. W. 300 (1927); Bank of New Milford v. New Milford, 36 Conn. 93
(1869); Comerford v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 59 Mont.
243, 196 Pac. 984 (1921); Interstate Business Men's Ass'n v. Nichols, 143
Ark. 369, 220 S. W. 477 (1920) ; Blakely v. Bradley, 99 S. C. 229, 83 S. E.
184 (1914); Benko v. Lenard, 191 Ill. App. 600 (1915); Fair v. Bowen,
Bacot v. South Carolina Loan and Trust Co., Knox County v. Goggin,
Cooper v. Headley, all supra note 13; Kentucky Central Life and Accident
Ins. Co. v. Edmonson, Andrews v. Bulldog Auto Fire Ins. Ass'n, Evans v.
International Life Ins. Co., Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Fox v.
COMMENTS
tention has been centered upon the "scope of authority" 20 or the
"adverse interest" of the "agent," 21 or upon findings, purportedly
of fact, that an "agency" did or did not exist.22
But by the use of agency terminology in situations analogous
to that of the instant case courts have avoided assigning reasons
for placing the risk of the intermediary's defalcation upon one
"principal" rather than upon the other. In order to determine
upon whom such risk should be placed in the stockbroker-custo-
mer situation, it is first necessary to examine the role played by
the "customers' man" in the course of stock dealing. Such an
individual is a salaried employee of the broker who solicits busi-
ness, handles customers' accounts, and advises with customers
concerning the purchase and sale of securities."3 Ordinarily he
acts only on specific orders from the customer and no power of
attorney is involved. 4 Under these "ordinary" circumstances, the
risk of the intermediary's defalcation in the course of routine
business seems to be so clearly upon the broker that the ques-
tion has not even been litigated.F The broker has probably had
Volunteer Life Ins. Co., Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., all supra
note 14.
2 0 Jacks v. Manning, supra note 17.
- Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. 355 (1896) ; Innerarity v. Mer-
chants' National Bank, 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282 (1885).
- See Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., supra note 13, at 146, 53 N. W.
at 181.
23 See Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 1, at 214, 169 N. E. at 282. Rule 1 of
the Supplementary Rules adopted on May 7, 1930, by the Committee on
Quotations and Commissions of the New York Stock Exchange defines
"customers' man" as follows: "The term 'customers' men' shall be construed
to include all employees who are regularly engaged in the solicitation of
marginal business or the handling of customers! accounts, or who advise
with customers about the purchase and sale of securities. All branch office
managers, and also securities salesmen who more than occasionally advise
customers in regard to the purchase and sale of securities on margin, or
who handle marginal accounts, shall be considered as customers' men.'
24 This applies both to trading on margin and for cash. No power of
attorney is involved in the usual margin account and the purely ministerial
-function of the intermediary has not changed. Hence so far as the risk al-
location is concerned, there seems no reason to distinguish the margin ac-
count situation from that of the cash deal. It is a common practice of brok-
ers to require margin customers to sign away their formal rights by so-
called "consent cards" at the time of opening the account. Problems raised
by this practice are, however, outside the scope of the present comment
See Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 628.
25 See Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 1. As to matters somewhat apart
from the strictly routine, the broker has been held responsible for knowl-
edge of the intermediary that certain "sales" were merely in the nature of
gaming contracts and void. Allen v. Fuller, 182 Mlass. 702, 65 N. E. 31
(1902); cf. Ware & Leland v. Heiss, 133 Iowa 285, 110 N. W. 594 (1907)
(grain brokers); Alex Hyman & Co. v. Hay, 277 Fed. 898 (C. C. A. 5th,
1922) (independent intermediary). It has also been held that a broker is
19301 1177/
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the best opportunity to guard against such loss by exercising
care in the selection and retention of the "customers' man," 2
and the understanding of both the customer and the broker prob-
ably coincides with such an allocation of the risk.27 Furthermore,
since the customer probably relies upon the integrity of the firm
rather than upon the integrity of the "customers' man," the risk
of loss arising from the acts of the firm's employee should be
borne by the firm.
A "discretionary" trading account, such as that involved in
the instant case, differs considerably from the ordinary account.
Here the customer entrusts the management of his trading trans-
actions to a "customers' man" by authorizing him to buy and sell
without specific orders. Brokers apparently discourage the "dis-
cretionary" account.2 8 Where such an account is permitted, a
power of attorney must be executed in behalf of the "customers'
man" who is to operate it.29 This power of attorney is generally
drawn up on a form sheet of the broker and by its terms the
broker aims to stipulate specifically that the risk of all losses re-
sulting from its operation shall fall upon the customer. 0 Fur-
charged with notice received by his cashier of the theft of numbered bonds.
Heney v. Sutro & Co., 28 Cal. App. 698, 153 Pac. 972 (1915).
26 Cf. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 584, 720.
27 Cf. Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38
YALE L. J. 25, 27.
28 See Transcript of Record 236, in Bosak v. Parrish, supra note 1. Some
firms have refused to allow discretionary accounts to be operated by "cus-
tomers' men." Now, by Rule 6 "of the Supplementary Rules of the New
York Stock Exchange, supra note 23, it is provided that: "Customers' men
and all other employees are prohibited from handling discretionary ac-
counts. Discretionary power in the handling of an account may be vested
only in partners. A partner may delegate such discretionary power to a
customers' man to a reasonable extent, provided the consent of the customer
in writing is first obtained. Such delegation of discretionary power by a
partner to a customers' man does not relieve the partner of responsibility."
The new ruling will probably not be as startling in its effect as would
first appear. It is not retroactive, and litigation involving "discretionary"
accounts operated previously to May 7, 1930, will arise for several years
to come. Moreover, the rule does not apply to houses not members of the
New York Stock Exchange. Furthermore, under the new ruling, "custo-
mers' men" are permitted, and probably will in fact continue, to handle the
active operation of discretionary accounts, provided the primary discretion-
ary power is vested in one of the partners. Thus the question of whether
the "customers' man" would be acting within the scope of his authority in
receiving notice, of revocation would still seem somewhat doubtful.
29 In behalf of a partner of the brokerage firm now. See supra note 28.
so The following form has been used by one brokerage house:
Gentlemen:
is now employed by you, and I am desirous of hav-
ing him act for me and as my agent in the purchase and/or sale of various
securities for my account and risk.
COMMENTS
thermore, such a "discretionary" account is obviously established
only when the customer has particular confidence in the "custo-
mers' man." Hence, in contrast with the "ordinary" situation,
the customer's reliance would seem to be rather upon the in-
tegrity of the "customers' man" than upon the integrity of the
brokerage firm.
Turning from the stock brokerage case to the similar problem
arising in the insurance situation, it will be observed that there
the intermediary is generally a soliciting agent ,' of the insur-
ance company and as such is technically an employee of the in-
surer and paid by the insurer alone. The act of defalcation may
This is to advise you that until further written notice to you by me said
is duly authorized in his sole, absolute and unrestricted
discretion to give orders for purchases and sales of stocks, bonds and/or
other securities for my account and risk and in my name through you and
in so doing he shall act as my agent and not as yours.
You are authorized and empowered to honor his directions and/or orders
as you would mine, and to the same extent as though said account were
his own, and I hereby ratify and confirm everything that Mr.
may do for my account with you.
Yours very truly,
Witness Customer.
It will be noticed that the above power of attorney does not squarely meet
the issue of revocation of authority. A power of attorney drawn up with
this end in view, shortly after the Appellate Division decision in the instant
case, follows:
Dear Sirs:
I hereby authorize to buy, sell and trade in, for my
account and risk, and in my name, stocks, bonds and any other securities
and/or commodities on margin or otherwise and in accordance with your
terms and conditions; and I hereby agree to indemnify and hold you harm-
less from and to pay you on demand any and all losses arising therefrom
or debit balance due thereon. You will kindly follow his instructions in
every respect concerning said account, and make payments of moneys and
deliveries of securities to him or otherwise as he may order and direct.
In all matters and things aforementioned he is authorized to act for me
and in my behalf, in the same manner and with the same force and effect
as I might or could do, and he shall be deemed to be my agent and not
yours for all purposes pursuant to the transaction of all business under
the authorization.
I hereby waive notification to me of any of the aforementioned transac-
tions and deliveries of any statements, notices, or demands pertaining there-
to.
I hereby ratify any and all transactions heretofore or hereafter made by
him on or for my account.
This authorization is a continuing one and Shall remain in full force and
effect until receipt from me, by a member of your firm, of written notice
of any revocation thereof.
Dated Signed
31 Where the intermediary in question is a "general agent" he may ad-
mittedly bind the insurance company within broad limits and less doubt
exists concerning the company's responsibility for his acts. See Vucn,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 416418.
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be a negligent forwarding of an application or policy to the com-
pany; 32 a wrongful failure to deliver a completed policy to the
insured; 33 the inadvertent or wrongful setting down of false
answers to questions contained in the policy or application; 34 or
the failure to hand over premiums to the company. Ordinarily
the insurance company is held to bear the risk of loss arising
from the solicitor's defalcation on the ground that the solicitor
is acting as the "agent" of the insurer and hence the latter is
responsible as "principal." 35 Yet as to responsibility for false
statements written into a policy or for oral waiver of terms of
the policy by the soliciting agent, there is a strong minority view
which imposes that risk upon the insured .3  The minority deci-
sions proceed upon the theory that the solicitor in filling in the
application or policy is acting as the "agent" of the insured.3 T
Insurance companies have sought to avoid the risk of an inter-
mediary's misconduct by inserting a provision in their insurance
contracts specifically denying the authority of their "agents" to
change or waive orally any terms of the policy 3s But in juris-
dictions following the majority rule, that the company is respon-
sible for the acts of the solicitor, such a provision has been held
not to relieve the company of its responsibility.3 This result has
been defended on the ground that the agency relation is an "in-
cident created by the law in response to the demands of public
32 Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913);
Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329
(1912). -
33 Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., supra note 14.
34 Leisen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 20 N. D. 316, 127 N. W. 837
(1910); Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker and Dillard, 112 Tenn. 151,
79 S. W. 119 (1904) ; Anderson v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 57 N. D. 462,
222 N. W. 609 (1928).
35 Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., supra note 14; Duffle v. Bankers'
Life Ass'n, Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., both supra note 32;
Leisen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Continental Fire Ins. Co. v.
Whitaker and Dillard, Anderson v. United States Fire Ins. Co., all supra
note 34.
36 See Warner, The Effect of a Provision in an Insurance Policy Limiting
the Authority of an Agent to Alter the Contract (1917) 6 CALIF. L. REv.
203, 207. The minority rule was followed in a recent House of Lords deci-
sion. Newsholme Bros. v. Road Transport & General Ins. Co. Ltd., 34
Comm. Cas. 330 (1929). It is likewise the rule of the United States Su-
preme Court. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, supra note 14.
37See Warner, op. cit. supra note 36, at 204.
38 A typical clause provides: "No agent has power in behalf of the com-
pany, to make or modify this or any contract of insurance, to extend the
time for paying the premium, to waive any forfeiture, or to bind the com-
pany by making any promise, or by making or receiving any presentation
or information." See Warner, op. cit. supra note 36, at 203.
3 See Warner, op. cit. supra note 36, at 205.
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policy, irrespective of agreement, which cannot be destroyed or
altered by the agreement of the parties." 11
In the mortgage-loan transaction the intermediary is fre-
quently an independent broker to whom the borrower applies for
the purpose of obtaining a loan.4 1 The broker secures the loan
from one of several loan or mortgage companies for whom he
acts as correspondent, generally receiving a commission from
the borrower. Sometimes, however, the intermediary is a mere
paid employee of the lender42 The act of defalcation is usually
the embezzlement of funde. 3 It may be the wrongful omission
to attend to the formalities of placing or cancelling a mortgage
given as security for the loan;" or the failure to notify the mort-
gagee-lender of defects in title 4 or of his own bankruptcy.-"
Generally the borrower has been responsible for these acts of
defalcation,7 on the ground that the intermediary was acting as
the "agent" of the borrower and not of the lender.4 The loan
application signed by the borrower frequently stipulates that
the borrower appoints and will consider the intermediary his
"agent" for all purposes relating to the procuring of the loan. 9
Such provisions are often given operative effect, ° but are not
conclusive.51
Although the insurance and mortgage-loan decisions are usu
ally rationalized as turning upon the "agency" of the intermedi-
ary, there seem to be several underlying considerations upon
which the question of "agency" itself depends. Thus, wherever
one party exerts a considerable control over the intermediary,
there is a tendency to regard that party as the intermediary's
"principal." 52 One element of such control is the payment of the
40See VANCE, INSUraNCE (2d ed. 1930) 414.
4. Pepper v. Cairns, Lipman v. Noblit, Knox County v. Goggin, Fair v.
Bowen, all supra note 13.
412 Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., Dupree v. Coss Mortgage Co., Trav-
elers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, all supra note 13.
43 Pepper v. Cairns, Lipman v. Noblit, Cooper v. Headley, Bacot v. South
Carolina Loan & Trust Co., Knox County v. Goggin, Travelers' Ins. Co. v.
Jones, Fair v. Bowen, all supra note 13.
44 Moore v. Blackburn, .upra note 13.
45 Thomas v. Desney, supra note 13.
46 Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., 4utpra note 13.
-17 Supra notes 42-46.
48 In Fair v. Bowen, supra note 13, at 412, 86 N. W. at 991, it was said:
"The only question is whether in receiving the certificates of deposit, Hale
acted as the agent of complainant or represented Bowen. The circuit judge
was of the opinion that Hale represented defendant Bowen, and on a full
examination of the record, we agree with this conclusion."
49 See Land Mortgage Co. v. Gillam, supra note 13, at 350, 26 S. E. at 992.
50 Supra notes 42-46.
51 Land Mortgage Co. v. Gillam, Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., Trav-
elers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, all supra note 13.
52 Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., Evans v. International Life Ins.
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intermediary's salary or commission. In the insurance transac-
tion, where the intermediary receives his remuneration from the
insurer, responsibility for the solicitor's acts is usually placed
upon the insurer; 53 it is usually placed upon the borrower in the
mortgage-loan case wherever payment of commission is made by
the borrower.54 Although this element of control is generally not
decisive, it has been said that the mere fact of payment of a loan
broker's commission by the borrower is enough to make the
broker the "agent" of the borrower.5 5 Another type of control is
frequently exerted where forms are furnished prescribing the
terms upon which the business may be solicited and requiring
that each deal be approved and accepted at the home office. In
the insurance transaction the insurance company exerts such
supervisory control over its soliciting agents, and is accordingly
held responsible for their acts.5 6 In the mortgage-loan situation,
where the lender controls the intermediary to a lesser degree,
the responsibility is frequently placed upon the borrower.51 And
when the lender is held responsible it is generally under circum-
stances where he has in fact considerable supervisory control.5 8
A further consideration determining the existence of an
"agency" is the extent to which reliance is placed in the inter-
mediary rather than in .the party whom he represents. Since
a corporation must of necessity deal exclusively through "agents,"
there seems to be a strong tendency to hold it responsible for
the intermediary's acts. This result, which is reached in the in-
surance situation, is based upon a belief that the insured "will,
in spite of all theories of law, rely upon the statements of such
Co., Dyer v. Missouri Life Ins. Co., Andrews v. Bulldog Auto Fire Ins.
Ass'n, all supra note 14; Moore v. Blackburn, Thomas v. Desney, Bacot v.
South Carolina Loan & Trust Co., Knox County v. Goggin, Cooper v. Head-
ley, all supra note 13.
53 Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., Evans v. International Life
Ins. Co., both supra note 14; Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, Boyer v. State
Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., both supra note 32; Leisen v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker and Dillard, both
supra note -34.
5 Moore v. Blackburn, Thomas v. Desney, Bacot v. South Carolina Loan
and Trust Co., Knox County v. Goggin, Cooper v. Headley, all supra note 13.
55 Morris, J. in Moore v. Blackburn, supra note 13, at 120, 120 Pac. at
875: "It is undisputed that Kellogg was employed by Blackburn to obtain
this loan, and was to be paid a commission for his services. This fact alone,
-under the ruling of many cases, would make him the agent of Blackburn."
-5 Evans v. International Life Ins. Co., Dyer v. Missouri Life Ins. Co.,
Andrews v. Bulldog Auto Fire Ins. Ass'n, all supra note 14; Duffle v. Bank-
ers' Life Ass'n, Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., both supra
note 32.
57 Moore v. Blackburn, Thomas v. Desney, Pepper v. Cairns, Lipman v.
Noblit, Englemann v. Reuse, Fair v. Bowen, all supra note 13.
58 Land Mortgage Co. v. Gillam, Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., Trav-
elers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, all fupra note 13.
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agents, and will regard them as the company." *0 In the mort-
gage-loan transaction, where the intermediary may represent in-
dividual money lenders, there is less ground for emphasizing the
identity, and in fact this is the result reached by the decisions.cs
And yet where the lender is a large loan company which acts
solely through agents there is a tendency to hold the lender re-
sponsible.61
Applying these considerations to the stockbroker-customer sit-
uation, the fact that the "customers' man" is a paid employee of
the broker, and hence more or less subject to the broker's control,
is an argument for holding the broker responsible for the acts of
such employee. Moreover, he has been able, by dictating the form
of the power of attorney under which the "customers' man" oper-
ates, to control in some degree the terms under which the latter
may contract for him. But after the execution of the power of
attorney the broker has no control whatever over the operation
of the customer's account. Indeed, he will generally accept and
execute without question any orders given under it, and hence
for all practical purposes deals are controlled by the independent
action of the "customers' man." Moreover, as has already been
pointed out, one who authorizes discretionary trading probably
relies mainly upon the personal integrity of a particular "custo-
mers' man" and does not look upon that individual as acting on
behalf of the brokerage firm when executing discretionary orders.
Furthermore, there is an affirmative written authorization with
stipulations which indicate that the parties themselves have
agreed that the customer should bear the risk of the intermedi-
ary's defalcation.62 Finally, the broker is interested in market
transactions only to the extent of his commission, which is no
larger on trades executed for a "discretionary" account. In view
of these considerations, therefore, it would seem unfair to compel
the broker to bear the greater risks of the "discretionary" situa-
tion at no increase of remuneration therefor.Q
As noted above, the court in the instant case "distinguished"
the earlier decisions 64 relied upon by the plaintiff. The validity
of the distinction, however, seems doubtful; r indeed, neither of
59 See Dunbar, J. concurring opinion in Nixon v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
supra note 14, at 260, 65 Pac. at 197.
- Mloore v. Blackburn, Fair v. Bowen, Sergeant v. Martin, Bacot v.
South Carolina Loan & Trust Co., Englemann v. Reuse, all supra note 13.
61 Larson v. Lombard Investment Co., Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Jones, both
.=spa note 13.62 See powers of attorney, supra note 30.
6 See infra note 68.
64 mcConnell v. Hellwig, supra note 8; Eng v. Cammann, supra note 9;
Boyd v. Yerkes, supra note 10.
e Compare the definition of "customers' men" in the New York Stock
-Exchange Rule, supra note 23, which specifically includes branch niznagers
-within the scope of the term.
1930] 1183
1184 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
the lower courts which considered the case saw fit to recognize
it. The Court of Appeals rather seems to be laying down a rule
more lenient to the broker than that of the previous decisions."
In any event, the court is carefully restricting the broker's lia-
bility to that which was specifically put upon him by previous
adjudication, and is refusing to make even the slight additional
concession to the customer which an affirmance of the holding of
the lower court would necessitate. Generally in decisions involv-
ing "discretionary" accounts, the courts have apparently favored
the broker against the customer." To have held for the customer
in the instant case would have opened the door wide for collu-
sion between customers and "customers' men." 68
RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVILEGE OF ADVERTISING REPLACEMENT PARTS
FOR DEVICE MANUFACTURED BY .COMPETITOR
The legislative and judicial tendency to favor "free and un-
trammeled" competition, as exemplified in the Sherman I and
Clayton Acts 2 and the numerous decisions 3 in accord with their
economic philosophy, has long been tempered by the imposition
of restrictions upon competitive methods considered unfair or in-
equitable. Thus in protecting the custom created by a merchant
through the aid of some such distinctive device as a trade-mark,
the courts have often prohibited a competitor from marketing
his goods under a symbol somewhat similar to that of the
plaintiff.4  The generalization current in the decisions to the
66 Cf. Handville v. Drayton, 253 N. Y. 270, 170 N. E. 916 (1930).
67 Kratt v. Hopkins, 77 App. Div. 634, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (1st Dep't
1902) (customer held responsible for transactions executed by the broker
in reliance upon orders of "customers' man") ; Wilde v. Sawtelle, 232 Mass.
117, 122 N. E. 167 (1919) (loss of funds paid by broker to "customers'
man"); Carlisle v. Norris, 215 N. Y. 400, 109 N. E. 564 (1915) (loss of
stock certificates given by broker to "customers' man") ; Small v. Hous-
man, 208 N. Y. 115, 101 N. E. 700 (1913) (demand for margin made upon(customers' man").
6s It might be very easy, for example, for a dishonest customer and "cus-
tomers' man" to make some such arrangement as the following: A "dis-
cretionary" account to be opened and operated. If profits resulted, the
customer to ratify the intermediary's acts. If losses resulted, the customer
to make a claim of previous revocation of the power of attorney and to
recover the losses from the broker. Thus the broker would be compelled
to bear the entire risk, and a dishonest customer might be able to gamble
at his expense. The evidence of the instant case suggests this possibility.
See supra note 6.
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
238 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13, 14 (1926).
s See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S.
290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (1897) and Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904).
4SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADE-MARK LAW (1925) 134;
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effect that the plaintiff's trade-mark is infringed whenever the
defendant's imitation or use thereof is likely to deceive the or-
dinary purchaser into buying his goods as the plaintiff's,s has
had but slight value for lawyers interested in the prediction of
future judicial behavior.6 And least of all does such a formula
yield certainty in the complicated situations - where a manufac-
turer bf unpatented replacement parts suitable for use with a
device made by another, seeks to call this intended function to
the attention of prospective purchasers8
In a recent case 9 the complainant, manufacturer of safety
razors and blades under the trade-marks "Gem," "Star," and
"Ever-Ready" sought to enjoin the defendant from placing its
blades on the market in cartons bearing in addition to the de-
fendant's trade-mark "Sha-ve-zee," the words, "Will fit Sha-ve-
zee, Gem, Liberty, Ever-Ready and other razors." In refusing
the injunction, Runyon, D. J., said: "I am unable to discover
any feature or element therein which is calculated in the slight-
est degree to deceive or mislead a purchaser into the belief that it
contains plaintiff's products. In fact, it would appear to me
that any mental process which could arrive at an erroneous
conclusion as to identity of product after inspecting this carton
or placard is either wofully slipshod in its workings or merits
the charge of incompetence. '1 ° Yet, in reversing the decree
see also, by the same author, The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 813.
5 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U. S. 359, 368, 44 Sup. Ct 350, 351; Yale
Electric Co. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972, 973; ef. ROGERs, GOOD WILL,
TRADE MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING (1914) 65, 129; Rogers, The Unwary
Purchaser (1910). 8 MicH. L. Rsv. 613.
6 The oft-quoted dictum of Air. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 547 (1905), is worth noting
here: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major premise."
7 The manufacturer of the original device is often seeking protection
for a marketing plan in which the profits are derived from the sale of
replacement parts. But it is usually difficult for the defendant to make
clear the purpose of his wares without using the plaintiff's trade-mark.
And some courts fear that a verdict for the plaintiff will enable him to
gain a monopoly in an unpatented article.
s See NIMS, UNFAIR C0AiPETiT,; AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed. 1929) 389-
393.
9 American Safety Razor Corp. v. International Safety Razor Corp., 26
F. (2d) 108 (D. N. J. 1928), rev'd, 34 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929),
final injunction order in 36 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). Cf. Neostyle
Manufacturing Co. v. Ellam's Duplicator Co., 21 Rep. Pat. Cases 185
(1903), where the defendant was not enjoined from selling ink for the
plaintiff's machine in tins labelled, "For the Neostyle."
10 26 F. (2d) at 112. The doctrine of unclean hands which influenced
the decision of the lower court, is not discussed in this note. See Handler,
False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22, 49.
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and granting the injunction, Thomson, D. J., speaking for the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, declared: "The evidence clearly
establishes that the defendant's methods have led to continual
confusion, by which the public is constantly deceived." 11 The
conviction displayed by each of the learned judges quoted above
is somewhat puzzling in view of the fact that neither opinion
sets out any evidence of the reactions of the buying public to the
language of the defendant's advertising. Nor is it without sig-
nificance that not a single authority was cited to support the
reversal.1
2
Several courts have refused to enjoin a defendant from manu-
facturing and selling an article intended to be used as a replace-
ment part for a machine made by the plaintiff even though an
exact imitation of the plaintiff's part. 13 And in one such case 14
the court refused the plaintiff's request that the defendant be
ordered to mark his parts clearly to indicate their origin. Fur-
thermore a manufacturer of duplicate parts for the plaintiff's
harvesting machines has been permitted to stamp thereon the
letters and numbers used by the plaintiff, as the court said, to
facilitate replacement.15 But it has been held in a similar situa-
tion that a manufacturer of renewal plates for the plaintiff's
batteries must stamp them with his own name. 0
In Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F. S. Webster Co.,' where the
plaintiff made and sold "Underwood" typewriters and ribbons,
the defendant sold ribbons in boxes on which the single word,
"Underwood," appeared above its own trade-mark, "The Web-
ster, Star Brand." This was allowed as a proper method of
making it known that the ribbons were suitable for use in the
plaintiff's typewriter. But where the plaintiff's spark plugs
11 34 F. (2d) at 446.
12 It appears to be assumed that "the law is well settled." And the
cases are so handled that analogies are not particularly helpful.
4 Clipper Belt Lacer Co. v. Detroit Belt Lacer Co., 223 Mich. 399, 194
N. W. 125 (1923); Harvey Hubbell, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 262
Fed. 155 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); Pyle Nat Co. v. Oliver Electric Mfg. Co.,
281 Fed. 632 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922), certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 736, 43 Sup.
Ct. 96 (1922).
'4 Bender v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 156 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907),
rev'g 148 Fed. 313 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1906).
15 Deering Harvester Co. v. Whitman & Barnes Co., 91 Fed. 376 (C. C. A.
6th, 1898).
16 Edison Mfg. Co. v. Gladstone, 58 Atl. 391 (N. J. Ch. 1903). Cf. Flagg
v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N. E. 667 (1901); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v.
Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904); Moline Plow
Co. v. Omaha Iron Store Co., 235 Fed. 519 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916), certiorari
denied, 242 U. S. 649, 37 Sup. Ct. 242 (1917); Avery v. Meikle & Co., 81
Ky. 73 (1883).
17 144 Fed. 405 (S. D. N. Y. 1906).
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were used as factory equipment in Ford automobiles, 18 the de-
fendant was enjoined from advertising its plugs and cores as
follows: "Standard spark plugs for Fords," "Ford Plugs,"
"Ford Core," and "Manufactured expressly for use in the Ford
engine," on the ground that it effected a "palming off on the pub-
lic of the defendant's wares as plugs- and cores of the plaintiff's
manufacture." 19 This "finding of fact" was accompanied by the
statement, "We are not impressed by the objection of lack of
evidence that any one has been misled by the defendant's acts." 2"
There are several decisions to the effect that the defendant
may not label its replacement parts with the trade-mark used by
the plaintiff on the original device.2 1 But in Magee Furnace Co. v.
LeBarron,2 where the defendant made duplicate parts to fit the
plaintiff's stoves, the defendant's catalogue which listed his parts
under the plaintiff's trade-marks was found unobjectionable,
though the court suggested that the idea "would have been con-
veyed more unequivocally perhaps if the defendant had said,
'Grates to fit Chelsea Cook' instead of saying, as he did, 'Chelsea
Cook grates."' 23 And in Gledhill & Sons, Ltd. -v. British Perfo-
rated Toilet Paper Co., 4 it was held proper for the defendant to
sell for use in the plaintiff's cash registers paper stamped with
the plaintiff's trade-mark, "Gledhill." The defendant invoiced
the paper as "Gledhill Cash-till Rolls." Lord Justice Farwell
said: "That apparently means rolls adapted for use in the Gled-
hill cash-tills. I cannot understand how you could find a better
description." 25
In Ford Motor Co. v. Cady Co.,20 where the defendant made
and sold engines for motor boats he was enjoined from using the
is S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1925). Cf. Myles Standish Mfg. Co. v. Champion Spark Plug
Co., 282 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
19 3 F. (2d)- at 416.
20 Ibid. 419.
2' Ford Motor Co. v. Wilson, 223 Fed. 808 (D. R. L 1915) .... in
common acceptation, the word Ford would indicate, not merely adaptation
to use in Ford machines, but articles manufactured by the complainant
company"); Metal Stamping Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 33 F. (2d)
411 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) (defendant's hub caps bearing plaintiff's trade-
marks were sold from display cards bearing name of defendant as manu-
facturer); Reading Stove Works v. Howe, 201 Mass. 437, 87 N. E. '751
(1909) (defendant sold parts for plaintiff's "Sunshine" stoves stamped
"SS" or "S"); Duro Co. v. Duro Co., 27 F. (2d) 336 (D. N. J. 1927),
aff'd, 27 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Kodak, Ltd. v. London Stereo-
scopic & Photographic Co., Ltd., 20 Rep. Pat. Cases 337 (1903).
22127 Mass. 115 (1879).
2 Ibid. 122.
24 28 Rep. Pat. Cases 429 (1911), appeal dismissed, 28 Rep. Pat. Cases
714 (1911).
2s528 Rep. Pat. Cases at 720.
2S 124 Misc. 678, 208 N. Y. Supp. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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name "Cadyford." 27 The court said, "I think, and I find as a
fact, that the name'Cadyford' so resembles the plaintiff's trade-
mark 'Ford' that it is calculated to deceive the public and
cause confusion in the trade." 28 But where the defendant made
transmissions for Ford automobiles the Ford Motor Company
was unable to secure cancellation of the registered trade-mark,
"Warford." 2o
The rationale of the foregoing cases may be articulated in
terms of a syllogism whose major premise has been stated as
follows: ". . . it is lawful for one to make known the fact
that his repair or renewal parts will fit the device manufactured
by another, provided he does not mislead the public into believ"
ing that the replacement parts are manufactured by the other." 30
It is obvious that predictable results can be expected only in the
event that the courts achieve a greater degree of objectivity in
working out the minor premise, viz., that the defendant's meth-
ods are or are not likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser 11 into
the belief that his repair parts are made by the plaintiff.
Experiments in the psychology of trade-mark infringement 32
have demonstrated that in any case where a trader has been
allowed to continue using a mark adjudged non-infringing, a
considerable number of persons will nevertheless be induced
thereby to buy his goods in the belief that they are getting goods
of the plaintiff's manufacture. And they make it equally clear
that by no means all buyers would be thus confused by the
many other trade-marks which have been held so similar as to
infringe. 33 In other words, there are no psychological categories
such as confusing and non-confusing to correspond with the
two legal categories, infringing and non-infringing. It need
hardly be emphasized therefore that the usual a priori judgment
in these cases must necessarily be highly arbitrary, and that a
judgment based upon the testimony of a few witnesses that they
have or have not been deceived may be no less so.
In order to test the result arrived at in the principal case
the writer questioned fifty persons, selected at random, immedi-
27 Strictly, this is not a repair part case; but it is sufficiently similar to
warrant using it as an interesting contrast.
2BSupra note 26, at 681, 208 N. Y. Supp. at 577.
29 Ford Motor Co. v. Partridge, Singer & Baldwin, 26 F. (2d) 567 (Ct. of
App. D. C. 1928).
so (1928) 28 CoL. L. Rav. 1114.
31 "The so-called ordinary purchaser changes his mental qualities with
every judge . . . ." MONsTmBRG, AMERICAN PROBLEMS (1910) 171.
32 Paynter, A Psychological Study of Trade-Mark Infringement (1920
ARcHnvas oF PSYCHOLOGY, No. 42; Clark, Trade Name Infringement (1923)
34 AM. J. PSYCH. 602; Burtt, Measurement of Confusion between Similar
Trade Names (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 320.
33 In fact many marks adjudged non-infringing show a higher percentage
of confusion than those held to be infringements.
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ately after they had purchased the defendant's "Sha-ve-zee"
blades at Woolworth's store in New Haven. The answers given
tend to support the decision of the lower court in refusing to
grant an injunction24 Where available the use of such evi-
dence 35 in cases of this kind would afford considerable guidance
to judicial discretion. It is at least clear that in the absence of
standards possessing economic and psychological validity, the
line of cases with which this note is concerned will continue to
present an interesting example of the currency of a single
generalization coupled with unusual hazards in prediction.
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES ON MARITIME CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF THE OPERATION OF GOVERNM1ENT-OWNED
VESSELS
In the absence of statute, the United States government is
not responsible to private individuals either in tort or in con-
tract., Nor can property in its possession be made the object
of direct legal proceedings.2 Thus, prior to statutory enact-
3' Thirty-eight used the plaintiff's "Gem" razor and twelve the "Ever-
Ready." Forty-six answered in the negative the question, "Are these
blades made by the same company which makes your razor?" It is inter-
esting to note that of ten purchasers of the plaintiff's "Star" blades at
Kresge's store for use with either "Gem" or "Ever-Ready" razors, nine
were not aware that their blades and razors came from the same source.
"Star" blades are advertised to "fit Star, Gem and Ever-Ready razors."
35 It is possible that some courts would exclude such evidence as hearsay.
See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F. (2d) 37G (1928) (af-
fidavit of advertising expert based on 2000 questionnaires to jewelers ex-
cluded). But see Burtt, op. cit. sulra note 32, describing an experiment
the results of which were admitted without discussion in Citizens' Whole-
sale Supply Co. v. Downing, 107 Ohio St. 422, 140 N. E. 683 t192J). Nei-
ther of these cases, however, presents the precise issue of admissibility
involved in the evidence referred to in note 34. See 3 WIGNTORn. Evtz-.nvc
(2d ed. 1923) § 1729. And see State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 190 (1858)
for a possible analogy from which to argue that it does not fall within
the hearsay category.
- It has been proposed that the percentage of confusion having bccn
worked out in each case by experiment with a hundred or so indivilual. a
particular imitation be adjudged an infringement if this percentage i.
above a fixed point, otherwise not. The writer, however, believe- that
this suggestion is a bit premature for the reason that the " ariance .n
the conditions under which these experiments were conducted from actual
market conditions may prove upon further testing to have so affected the
results that their statement in quantitative terms will be -eon to g.ve unly
an illusion of certainty.
See Bonner v. United States, 9 Wall. 156, 159 (U. S. 1869) ; Haycroft
v. United States, 22 Wall. 81, 92 (U. S. 1874) ; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527 (1906).
2 Briggs v. The Light Boats, 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865).
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ment, the United States government was almost 3 wholly im-
mune from responsibility on admiralty claims arising from the
operation of its vessels, both as to actions in rem' and as to
those in personam .5 Since maritime claims against the govern-
ment more frequently sound in tort, the statutes 6 culminating in
the Tucker Act which consented to suits on contracts gave only
partial relief.
When, however, by the passage of the Shipping Act of 1916,'
the United States government entered the merchant shipping
business, it was provided in Section 9 of that statute that vessels
acquired under the terms of the Act should be subject to the
liabilities of privately owned ships, while operated solely as
merchant vessels. In The Lake Monroe,8 the United States
Supreme Court held that this provision subjected a government-
owned vessel to liability in rem. At the same time, under the
provisions of the Act merchant vessels were operated or char-
tered to private operators for the government by the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and, al-
though its stock was owned wholly by the United States, this
corporation was held suable at common law and in admiralty as
any private corporation., Thus, through a remedy against its
ships and a remedy against its agent, the United States after
the passag ° of the Shipping Act of 1916 was practically on an
3 If the United States comes into court to assert a claim against an indi-
vidual, it is deemed to have waived its immunity so far as to allow a pres-
entation of counterclaims and set-offs, but is exempt from costs and im-
mune from affirmative relief beyond the amount of the property in con-
troversy. Carlisle v. Cooper, 64 Fed. 472 (C. C. A. 2d 1894); United
States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328, 45 Sup. Ct. 112 k1924) ; The Barend-
recht, 286 Fed. 386 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), modified 9 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A.
2d, 1925).
4See The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, 20 (U. S. 1869) ; Lord, Admiralty Claims
Against the Governnment (1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 467, 471. In The Western
Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159 (1922), it was held that the govern-
ment's immunity not only precluded the enforcement of a lien on the ves-
sel while in the government's possession, but in addition prevented the en-
forcement of a damage claim against the vessel when returned to private
owneiship and operation. See Comment (1924) 31 YALE L. J. 879; (1922)
22 COL. L. REV. 589; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 390; (1924) 31 YALE L. J. 879.
See The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 154 (U. S. 1868).
610 STAT. 612 (1855), 28 U. S. C. § 241 (1926); 12 STAT. 765 (1863),
28 U. S. C. § 252 (1926); 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 250 (1) (1926).
(1926).
739 STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U. S. C. § 801 (1926).
8 250 U. S. 246, 39 Sup. Ct. 460 (1919).
9 U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Banque Russo Asiatique,
London, 286 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); see Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.
S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 588
(1922). The Emergency Fleet Corporation is now the United States Ship-
ping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation.
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equal footing of responsibility with private shipoN-ners, although
the government itself was still immune to tort liability in per-
sonam and to all tort actions arising from the operation of its
non-merchant vessels.
However, the arrest and seizure incident to the proceedings
in rem allowed by the Act of 1916 were the cause of much in-
convenience to the government. Consequently in 1920 the Suits
in Admiralty Act 20 was passed, prohibiting seizure,I and pro-
viding in its stead a special action in personam against the
United States and against the Fleet Corporation in cases involv-
ing government-owned ships "employed as merchant vessels." 1-
In 1925 the passage of the Public Vessels Act,"3 permitted a
libel in personam against the United States for causes of action
arising from the operation of its "public" vessels. These two
statutes form the basis of the present maritime responsibility
of the United States government for causes of action arising
from the operation of its ships. The precise nature of this re-
sponsibility is gradually being defined by an accumulation of
decisions.
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court seems to have
settled the question whether the Suits in Admiralty Act ex-
cludes any concurrent remedies upon the causes of action which
it covers. In United States Shippinzg Board Emergency Fleet
Conporation v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co.,1 4 a libel in personam
against the Fleet Corporation, filed after the expiration of the
period of limitation provided by the Act of 1920, was denied on
the ground that the Act gave the exclusive remedy in admiralty
against the United States and the Fleet Corporation. The Su-
preme Court has further held, in Johnson v. United States Ship-
ping Board Emergency Fleet Corporationy that no common
law remedies against the Fleet Corporation nor any relief
1041 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 741-752 (1926).
U 41 STAT. 525 §'1 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 741 (1926).
1241 STAT. 525 § 2 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1926). The primary pur-
pose of this section was declared by Senator Jones, the sponsor of the bill
in the Senate, to be "to avoid that [seizure] by simply providing that per-
sons having claims growing out of the action of these ships, instead of hav-
ing a suit in rem against the ship, as they have against private ships, shall
have a suit in personam against the United States which everybody, of
course, recognizes is perfectly good." 58 CoNG. REC. 7766 (1919).
13 43 STAT. 1112 '(1925), 46 U. S. C. §§ 781-790 (1926).
14 (The West Aleta), 276 U. S. 202, 48 Sup. Ct. 256 (1928). But see
The Caddo, 285 Fed. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), where it was held that the
Act of 1920 did not furnish the exclusive remedy when the vessel had
passed into private hands, but that a lien attached under § 9 of the Act
of 1916 which, while enforceable only in personam against the United
States, could be enforced by an attachment in rem when the vessel was
no longer owned and operated by the government.
25 50 Sup. Ct. 118 (U. S. 1930).
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against the United States provided by the Tucker Act 26 is
available upon any cause of action upon which a proceeding in
admiralty might be maintained between private parties. By
these decisions, the venue, service of process, periods of limita-
tion, rules of decision and procedure, rate of interest, and pay-
ment of judgments provided by the statute are made uniform
for the enforcement of all maritime claims arising from the
operation of government-owned merchant vessels.
The meaning of the phrase "employed as a merchant vessel"
as used in Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act is left very
uncertain by the few cases which have considered it. Little more
can be said than that it is regarded as a question of fact depend-
ing wholly upon the character of the service in which the vessel
is engaged at the time.' 7 How far the problem has now been
avoided by the passage of the Public Vessels Act will largely
depend upon whether a "public vessel" comes to be defined as
any government-owned non-merchant vessel or as one of some
narrower category. But at all events, the conflicting rules of
venue provided under the two acts 11 may still force the courts
to define "merchant vessel." Thus the problem might arise when
the libellant files a suit in the district of his residence for dam-
ages arising from a collision with an alleged merchant vessel,
although were it a "public" vessel, suit could only have been
brought in a district where the vessel could be found.
The further question has been raised whether it is necessary
to aver that the vessel is "employed as a merchant vessel" at the
1624 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 250 (1) (1926).
17 The Lake Lida, 290 Fed. 178 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) (a Shipping Board
vessel taken from the commercial service and chartered by the Navy Bu-
reau of Supplies to carry one cargo of coal for the use of the government,
held not to be employed at the time as a merchant vessel); The Hamburg,
298 Fed. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) (Shipping Board vessel used to train
apprentices for both the transport and merchant service held not to be
employed as a merchant vessel); The Augusta G. Hilton, 3 F. (2d) 808
(D. N. J. 1925) (vessel recently requisitioned by the Shipping Board bound
for port to be reconditioned pursuant to a contract between the Shipping
Board and a private company which was to operate her, held not to be
employed as a merchant vessel). But cf. Adams v. United States, 281
Fed. 895 (D. Mass. 1922) (Shipping Board vessel, after being used by the
navy in harbor for repairs, after being formally turned back to the Ship-
ping Board but still manned with naval crew, held employed as a mer-
chant vessel).
1841 STAT. 525 § 2 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1926). See infra notes
30 and 33. 43 STAT. 1112 § 2 (1925), 46 U. S. C. § 782 (1926). "Such
suit shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the
district in which the vessel or cargo charged with creating the liability is
found within the United States, or if such vessel or cargo be outside the
United States, then in the district court for the district in which the




time the libel is filed, as well as when the cause of action arose.
Two district courts have so held." However, the Supreme Court,
in Shewan & Sans Inc. v. United Statcs,=o held that the former
allegation was unnecessary where it appeared that, before the
libel was filed, the vessel had been taken from the service and
"laid up." But the court intimated that since the government
was sought to be charged with what would be, were the vessel
privately owned, a liability in rem, the date of the suit might
become important had the character of the ship changed from
that of a merchant to a "public" vessel after the cause of action
arose.2 It is difficult to see how the court would be compelled
to come to this conclusion by the statute, tind still more difficult
to justify the limitation which such a rule would place upon the
government's responsibility. At all events, where the action is
one which, against private parties, would be a libel in per-
sonam the allegation should be unnecessary. Indeed, it might
well be held that the Public Vessels Act makes the averment
superfluous in all cases.
The nature of the relief granted by the Suits in Admiralty
Act was for several years left uncertain by the conflicting de-
cisions of the lower federal courts. The Act provided that "in
cases where, if such vessel were privately owned or operated,
or if such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceed-
ing in admiralty could be maintained at the commencement of
the action herein provided for, a libel in personam may be
brought against the United States or against such corporation
[Emergency Fleet Corporation]."22 Several courts held that the
statute was restricted in its scope to those cases where a libel in
rem could have been maintained under the Shipping Act of
1916.23 The Supreme Court, however, in Eastern Transportat-
tion Co. v. United Statcs,24 held that where a libel in personam
could have been brought against a private party, a libel in
personam could be maintained against the United States. It
has been argued that even in those cases in which the cause of
action would give rise only to a libel in rem against a privately
owned vessel, the act subjects the United States to that degree
of liability which is imposed in a libel in personam against pri-
39 Mack Engineering & Supply Co. v. United States, 291 Fed. 713 (S. D.
N. Y. 1922); The Awensdaw, 8 F. (2d) 61 (E. D. S. C. 1923).
20 266 U. S. 108, 45 Sup. Ct. 45 (1924).
21 Ibid. 112, 45 Sup. Ct. at 46.
2241 STAT. 525 § 2 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1926).
2-3Villigas v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 300 (E. D. N. Y. 19221; Grace
v. United States, 8 -F. (2d) 80 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
24 (The Snug Harbor), 272 U. S. 675, 47 Sup. Ct. 289 (1927). See (1926)
35 YALE L. J. 877.
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vate parties; but this view has never been sustained.5 In gen-
eral, it may be said that the statutory libel in personam is one
in form only, and that, except where a liability in personam
would exist between private parties, the liability of the United
States is merely substituted for the liability of the ship.2 0 Thus,
in a case where the action arises from a responsibility in rem,
the damages recoverable in the statutory libel in personam are
limited to the amount which would be recoverable in a libel in
rem.27 Likewise, a libel in personam cannot be maintained for
a cause of action only in rem if the vessel is not within the jur-
isdiction of the United States where it might be attached were
it privately owned.28
In dealing with the rules of venue the majority of the lower
federal courts followed the same theory that the Act of 1920
should be interpreted in the light of the rules in admiralty suits
between private parties. Section 2 of the Act provides that
suits shall be brought in the district court of the district where
the libellant "resides, or has his principal place of business in
the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with
liability is found." It was generally held that when the action
was in the nature of proceeding in rem, the libel could only be
brought in the district where the res was located, as would be
the case were the vessel or cargo privately owned.29  The Su-
preme Court, however, in Nahmeh v. United States,3 held that
25 Blamberg Bros. v. United States, 260 U. S. 452, 43 Sup. Ct. 179 (1923);
United States v. Neptune Line, 12 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
26 The Caddo, supra note 14; United States v. Neptune Line, supra note
25; Hansen v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 321 (S. D. Ga. 1926). Cf. 41
STAT. 525 § 3. (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 743 (1926). See B-NEDIcT, THE AMER-
ICAN ADMIE.ALTY (5th ed. 1925) § 194.
27 United States v. Neptune Line, supra note 25; Hudson Trading Co.
v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
28 Blamberg Bros. v. United States, supra note 25.
29 The Isonomia, 285 Fed. 516 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; Grays Harbor Steve-
doring Co. v. United States, 286 Fed. 444 (W. D. Wash. 1923). Contra:
Thomson v. United States, 287 Fed. 364 (S. D. Ala. 1923). See (1923)
32 YALE L. J. 839; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 594.
30 267 U. S. 122, 45 Sup. Ct. 277 (1925). See Middleton & Co. v. United
States, 273 Fed. 199, 201 (E. D. S. C. 1921) (dictum that if libellant has
no residence or place of business in the United States and the vessel
charged with liability cannot be found there, libel may be maintained in
any district). Cf. The Elmac, '285 Fed. 665 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) (dictum
contra). The United States can only be impleaded under Admiralty Rule
56 in a district where it might be sued. The Cotati, 2 F. (2d) 394 (S. D.
N. Y. 1923). "District", within the meaning of § 2 of the act of 1920,
refers to the jurisdictional and not the territorial limits. Gafle Manufack-
tur Actiebolag v. United States, 291 Fed. 927 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
Venue may be waived by a general appearance even though the libel be
in the nature of an action in rem. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. United
States, 19 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
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in such an action, a libel could be filed in the district of residence
or place of business as well, irrespective of the location of the
res, so long as it was within the jurisdiction of the United States.
By this liberal construction of the statute, suit is made more
convenient for the libellant at no sacrifice of the interests of
the respondent, for the United States is equally present in any
district. Moreover, the evidentiary value of the ship is greatly
curtailed by the inability to detain it under process, and such ad-
vantages as there may be from holding the suit near the res
nay be secured under the provision of Section 2 which permits
transfer of the cause to any district at the discretion of the court.
Similar problems of venue are still unsettled where the libels
against the government are such as would be libels in personam
against private parties. Contrary to the rule of actions in rem,3'
it is immaterial whether any res be within the territory of the
United States.2 But should the vessel or cargo be found within
the jurisdiction, of a district court, it would appear to be an
open question whether under the Suits in Admiralty Act, a libel
purely in personam might not, on that account, be maintained
there, 3 3 in as much as such a procedure would ordinarily not be
permitted between private parties. The words of the pertinent
provision seem to refer only to liability in rem,3 4 so that it may
be doubted whether the Supreme.Court would assent to such a
broad construction of the Statute. Moreover, the provision for
the transfer of causes to other districts at the discretion of the
court leaves little need for the alternative venue.
The responsibility of the United States under the Public Ves-
sels Act has as yet been considered in but a few cases,3 5 though
s, Supra note 28.
32 Cross v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 86 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Galban Lobo
& Co. v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). Contra:
Markle v. United States, 8 F. (2d) 87 (S. D. Tex. 1925).
33 The Elmac, =pra note 30, held that the mere presence of the ves-
sel within the district was not enough to give jurisdiction over the person.
34 41 STAT. 525 § 2 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 742 (1926). "Such suits shall
'be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in
-which . . . or in which the vessel or cargo charged with liability is
found."
3 O'Neal v. United States, 11 F. (2d) 869 (E. D. 1925), aff'd, 11 F. (2d)
371 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (action for injuries to seaman from explosion of
shell in hands of gunner's mate dismissed); Bull Steamship Co. v. United
States, 21 F. (2d) 835 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) (cargo owner can intervene in
libel by shipowner against the United States when he might file an original
libel); The City of Rome, States, 24 F. (2d) 729 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) (ship-
owners recovered half damages for injury to vessel in collision with sub-
marine); In re United States Steel Products Co., 24 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928) (held that Public Vessels Act did not give the exclusive remedy
against the United States to the extent of barring recovery on a counter-
claim in an action by the government after the statutory period of limita-
tion) ; Phalen v. United States, 32 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (the
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it has been held not to extend to death or injuries caused to the
vessel's own crew by its unseaworthIness, compensation for such
injuries having been provided for in other ways." It would be
very unfortunate should the courts still further restrict its ap-
plication. The Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels
Act together should be made to give as complete protection
against the operation of all government vessels as is given by
admiralty law between private individuals. That they should
do more is perhaps unnecessary, but that they should do less
would be most regrettable.
PENDENCY OF FOREIGN SUIT IN PERSONAM ON SAME CAUSE OF
ACTION AS GROUND FOR ABATEMENT OR STAY
The rule has become firmly established in the federal courts 1
that a prior action in personam 2 pending in a foreign jurisdic-
tion 3 may not be pleaded in abatement to a second suit between
the same parties upon the same cause of action. And the ma-
jority of the state courts which have had occasion to consider
the question have expressed adherence to the same rule 4 either
time limitation of actions of one year, provided by the Suits in Admiralty
Act, is incorporated by reference in the Public Vessels Act).
a6 Haselden v. United States, 24 F. (2d) 529 (E. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd,
27 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
1 Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876); Franzen v. Chicago M. &
St. P. Ry., 278 Fed. 370 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921). For an extended collection
of federal authorities, see Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 449.
2 Where both actions are in rem and the court in the first action has
taken possession of the res, the second action will be stayed in order to
avoid a conflict of courts with respect to the specific property. Hughes v.
Green, 84 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898). And even where no property has
actually been taken into possession, but such action may become necessary
during the course of the trial, the second action has been stayed. Zim-
merman v. So Relle, 80 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Amusement Syn-
dicate Co. v. El Paso Land Improvement Co., 251 Fed. 345 (W. D. Tex.
1918). But cf. Slaughter v. Mallett Land & Cattle Co., 141 Fed. 282 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1905). While this situation has been stated as an exception
to the general rule, it has been held error to dismiss rather than merely
stay the action. Boston Acme Mines Corp. v. Salina Canyon Coal Co.,
3 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
3For this purpose the state courts have been held foreign to the federal
courts even where sitting in the same state. Boston & Maine R. R. v.
Dutille, 289 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923); Central Iron & Coal Co. v.
Massey, 268 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920).
4 The courts of the various states regard other states as foreign. And
by the weight of authority the federal courts, even when sitting in the
same state, are regarded as foreign. Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 449. But
a few states have held a federal court in the same state not to be foreign.
Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 22 N. H. 21 (1850) ; Inter-
state Chemical Corp. v. Home Guano Co., 199 Ala. 583, 75 So. 166 (1917).
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by way of decision 5 or dicta.,
The rule is of English origin and was first enunciated in the
case of Lord Dillon v. Alvares 7 where a suit pending in Scot-
land was pleaded in abatement to a subsequent and identical suit
in England. The plea was overruled without comment. A later
English court explained the decision as based on the fact that
a decree of an English court could not at that date have been
enforced in Scotland In the case of Cox v. Mitchell,O a foreign
action was again pleaded by the defendant in an English action,
but this time by a motion to stay. The motion was denied solely
on the ground that no judicial authority could be found for
granting the stay. Subsequently, in the case of McHenry r.
Lewis,"0 Cox v. Mitchell was cited by counsel as authority for
the proposition that a domestic suit could not be stayed merely
because of the pendency of an action abroad. While the court
refused to grant the stay due to the fact that the American
court could not there give full relief, it expressly affirmed the
power of the court to stay a subsequent domestic action, shown
to be vexatious. The court, noting that a second action in the
same jurisdiction between the same parties and upon the same
cause of action is presumed to be vexatious and is therefore a
proper ground for granting a stay, expressed the view that a
second suit in a foreign jurisdiction should similarly be regarded
as vexatious if it could be shown that no legitimate advantage
was to be gained thereby. Certainly modem English decisions 1
recognize that no insurmountable reasons of policy forbid the
granting of a stay, and the question is placed within the dis-
Walsh v. Durkin, 12 Johns. 99 (N. Y. 1815); Kerr v. Willetts, 48
N. J. L. 78, 2 Atl. 782 (1886); Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326 (1863);
Loomis v. Federal Union Surety Co., 163 Ill. App. 621 (1911) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Howington, 198 Ala. 311, 73 So. 550 (1916); Note
(1899) 42 L. R. A. 449, 450. Contra: Cunningham v. Robinson & Thatcher,
1 Utah 31 (1873); City of Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas & Elect. Light Co., 100
Neb. 188, 158 N. W. 964 (1916).
c The decisions of the courts in many cases can not be regarded as
holdings on the point, since the second suit was of such nature that It
would not have been abated even had both actions been in the same juris-
diction. See Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 484 (1853); Baird & Scales v.
Tyler Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 147 S. W. 1168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912);
Lorio v. Gladney, 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365 (1920).
7 4 Ves. 357 (1798). The aefendant had brought an action at law in
Scotland and was threatening to bring a similar action in England. The
plaintiff thereupon filed suit in equity in Scotland to enjoin both actions,
and subsequently brought this suit in equity in England asking the same
relief.
8McHenry v. Lewis, 22 Ch. D. 397 (1882). The plea in abatement no
longer appears to be used in England.
97 C. B. (N. s.) 55 (1859).
'O-Suprn note 8.
-I The view expressed in McHenry v. Lewis has been approved in sub-
sequent English cases. See Hyman v. Helm, 24 Ch. D. 531, 537 (1883);
Mutrie v. Binney, 35 Ch. D. 614, 624 (1886).
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cretion of the trial court, to be determined by the particular
circumstances of each case.
Numerous dicta of American courts are to be found to the
effect that the pendency of a foreign action, although not suffi-
cient to sustain a plea in abatement, may be ground for grant-
ing a stay.?2 Yet the pleading of a pending foreign action by
a motion to stay has rarely been employed in the United States.
Only in New York has the motion been extensively used to stay
domestic actions pending the determination of suits in foreign
jurisdictions.' 3
The reasons advanced by the American courts in support of
the existing rule denying a plea in abatement are to a large
degree unconvincing, particularly when considered as potential
reasons for refusing a stay.14 No unanimity of rationalization
is to be found except in the defensive assertion that a conflict of
courts with respect to the disposition of specific property will
not be caused by allowing the second action to proceed, inasmuch
as at least one of the actions will be in personam.'s
Aside from the persuasive force of precedent, the real motives
behind the rule are largely matters of conjecture. It may be due
to a simple belief that, in the majority of cases, the second ac-
tion is not vexatious but is instituted to secure some valid ad-
1 See Hatch v. Spofford, supra note 6, at 498; Kerr v. Willetts, supra note
5, at 80, 2 Atl. at 783; Margarum v. Moon, 63 N. J. Eq. 586, 590, 53 Atl.
179, 181 (1902); Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Housley, 46 Okla. 216, 220, 148
Pac. 689, 691 (1915); Beneke v. Tucker, 90 Ore. 230, 235, 176 Pac. 183,
185 (1918).
13 Allentown F. & M. Works v. Loretz, 16 App. Div. 72, 44 N. Y. Supp.
689 (2d Dep't 1897); Peacock v. Lutz & Schramm Co., 171 App. Div. 256,
157 N. Y. Supp. 175 (1st Dep't 1916). A few isolated cases are to be
found in other states where an action on a foreign judgment has been
stayed pending a determination of an appeal on the judgment in the
foreign jurisdiction. Parmalee v. Wheeler, 32 Wis. 429 (1873); German
Trust Co. v. Plotke, 275 Pa. 10, 118 Atl. 508 (1922). In Oppenheimer v.
Carabay Rubber & Navigation Co., 145 App. Div. 830, 130 N. Y. Supp.
987 (1st Dep't 1911) the court stressed the fact that the laws of England
were similar to those of New York and that the English action could
give a complete settlement of the controversy while the New York action
could not.
14 Among the asserted reasons are the following: (1) that the court
cannot know whether a foreign court can give an adequate remedy, Hatch
v. Spofford, supra note 6; Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N. C. 29 (1876); Kerr v.
Willetts, supra note 5; (2) that a foreign court is without power to en-
force its decrees beyond its own borders, Smith v. Atlantic Mutual Fire
Ins. Co., supra note 4; (3) that a litigant is entitled to sue in any court
which has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the ac-
tion, Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 fI1. 383, 115 N. E. 554 (1917);
(4) .that a judgment in either suit, when obtained, may be pleaded in bar
to the other action, Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns 221 (1812).
25 Russell v. Alvarez, 5 Cal. 48 (1885); Lamar v. Spalding, 154 Fed.
27 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907).
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vantage.?6 More probably, the most compelling motive lies in
an unreasoned reluctance on the part of the courts to yield
their concurrent jurisdiction to that of the federal courts or the
courts of another state. A -third possibility is a desire to prevent
litigation of disputes which might be settled out of court if no
premium is put upon the winning of a race between the parties,
each attempting to file suit before the other in the jurisdiction
of his choice. But the practical result of the existing rule is
to cause a race for priority of judgment, since, under the "full
faith and credit" clause of the Federal Constitution, a judgment
in either suit may be pleaded in bar to the other 7
Among the various situations in which the problem may arise,
the strongest case for allowing, at the court's discretion, at
least a temporary blocking of the second action is presented
where the same plaintiff asks the same relief in a foreign suit
upon the same cause of action. Under the existing rule, a demur-
rer to a plea in abatement will be sustained without regard to
the circumstances of the particular case. 6 The fact that the
second suit was instituted, allegedly for the sole purpose of
vexing the defendant, has been held immaterial.V0 Yet such a
second suit in the same jurisdiction is universally held vexatious
and proper ground for abatement since the full relief avail-
able in the second action may be secured in the first 2 0
Possible non-vexatious motives for suit in a second state,
which would not be present were the second action brought in
the same state, relate to calendar conditions,"- and the ability to
attach property 22 or garnish debts.2 3 Yet the danger of denying
16 But while this may be so where the second action is instituted by the
defendant in the first action, there is much less likelihood that such is the
case where the same party is the plaintiff in each action.
17 FREEuAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1394, n. 19.
isKerr v. Willetts; Loomis v. Federal Union Surety Co.; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Howington, all supra note 5.
u9 McNamara v. McAllister, 150 Iowa 243, 130 N. W. 26 (1911). Cf.
Greer v. Cook, 88 Ark. 93, 113 S. W. 1009 (1908) in which an injunction
to restrain an allegedly vexatious foreign suit in personam was denied,
the court suggesting that the remedy of the defendant lay in a suit for
abuse of process.
20 It is specifically provided in the codes of most states that the fact of
another action pending in the same jurisdiction is ground for demurrer
or an answer in abatement. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11309; Mo.
Rv. ST. (1919) § 1226; CAL. CODE OF CirV. PROc. (1915) § 430. This point
was formerly raised by demurrer in New York. N. Y. CODE Civ. Pac.
(1920) § 488. But the demurrer has been abolished and the objection is
now raised by a motion for judgment. N. Y. C. P. A. (1925) § 277.
21 One of the reasons advanced in the case of McHenry v. Lewis, supra
note 8, at 403, for a refusal to stay the English action was that the English
action might reach a trial sooner than that in the United States.
= Cf. Locomobile Co. v. American Bridge Co., 80 App. Div. 44, 80 N. Y.
Supp. 288 (1st Dep't 1903); Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 23 Ch. D.
225 (1883).
23 Cf. Salmon v. Wooton, 9 Dana 422 (Ky. 1840).
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the plaintiff the latter two advantages would be guarded against
by the court's discretionary power in granting the stay. Thus
the grant might be conditioned upon the defendant's furnish-
ing a bond sufficient to satisfy any judgment which might be
rendered in the prior action. Even where the advantages sought
by the plaintiff in the second suit are legitimate, the defendant
may be put to the expense of defending two actions, and the
general overcrowding of the courts may be increased by the
necessity of docketing a duplicate suit. Yet the possible disad-
vantages to plaintiff, defendant, and courts may usually be obvi-
ated through a dismissal of the first action,2 4 and a resultant
avoidance of continuing the two suits simultaneously. Thus it
would appear desirable either to stay or abate the second action,
should the plaintiff not adopt the course of dismissing the prior
suit.
Under exceptional circumstances it may appear that distinct
advantages can be secured by the plaintiff in each action, all of
which may not be available in either alone. Thus one jurisdic-
tion may afford the plaintiff greater convenience of trial due,
for example, to the domicil of the witnesses in that state, where-
as a jurisdictional question may result in an adverse deter-
mination of the suit on that issue, after the statute of limitations
has barred subsequent suit in another state. To preserve his
right of action, the plaintiff may well start a prior suit in a
court the jurisdiction of which is unquestioned. In such a situa-
tion the second suit is clearly not vexatious and should not be
stayed; and a forced dismissal of the prior action would deprive
the plaintiff of an expedient procedural device. Moreover, the
defendant can avoid the necessity of defending the two suits
simultaneously by moving to stay the prior action pending the
determination of the jurisdictional question in the other state .2
A second general situation is presented where it is the de-
fendant in the prior action who sues in another jurisdiction upon
a cause of action arising out of the same transaction and involv-
ing the same issue, the adjudication of which in the prior liti-
24 In the case of domestic suits, a few courts have sustained a plea in
abatement where the prior action was not dismissed until after the plea
was filed. But the better view appears to be that the plea will be overruled
if the prior action is dismissed even after the plea is filed but before a
hearing on the plea. Cf. (1916) 16 COL L. REv. 356.
25 In ruling on the motion to stay, the court should consider the rapidity
with which the jurisdictional issue may be determined. Under the pro-
cedure in certain states an objection to lack of jurisdiction over the de-
fendant must be appealed directly and is waived by going to trial on the
merits. Corbett v. Physicians Casualty Ass'n, 135 Wis. 505, 115 N. W.
365 (1908). But in other states the objection may be saved and an appeal
taken on the jurisdictional issue even after a trial on the merits. Harkness
v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476 (1878).
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gation would completely determine the second.26 Even where
both actions are brought in the same jurisdiction, most courts
will refuse to abate the second action.2 7  But in those states
where a plea in abatement will be overruled, a stay may often
be granted.s There is much less likelihood here that the second
suit has been instituted for vexatious purposes, although the
issue might have been presented as a counterclaim in the prior
action. One or more of the motives for suit abroad which were
suggested above might justify the use of the claim affirmatively
in a second jurisdiction. Yet double litigation is here practically
inevitable, since the plaintiff has no power to dismiss the prior
action in which he is the defendant. In such circumstances a
discretionary power in the court would enable it to refuse the
stay where the compulsory use of a counterclaim - would work
injustice.
A third general situation appears where the plaintiff seeks
either to abate or stay a counterclaim, on the ground of a prior
action by the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction upon the same
cause as the counterclaim. A plea in abatement will here be
overruled2 Yet, if both suits were in the same jurisdiction,
the counterclaim would be abated as vexatious.3 1 The only dis-
tinction between this situation and that where the same plaintiff
brings successive actions would appear to be one of pure form
in that here the second suit was not instituted by the original
plaintiff. As to the cause of action sought to be stayed, the
same party is the claimant in both actions. The same possible
26 In this situation a plea in abatement will be overruled. Doane v. Cal-
ifornia Land Co., 243 Fed. 67 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Inter-Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. McQuarrie, 148 Ga. 233, 96 S. E. 424 (1918) ; Wilson v. Brauer,
202 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1924). Contra: City of Lincoln v. Lincoln Gas &
Elect. Light Co., supra note 5.
27 National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 189 N. Y. 84, 81 N. E. 562 (1907);
Chapman v. Lambert, 176 Ind. 461, 96 N. E. 459 (1911); Pollock v. Kin-
man, 176 Ill. App. 36 (1912); Moore v. Henderson, 87 W. Va. 699, 105 S.
E. 903 (1921); Rookery Realty Loan Investment & Bldg. Co. v. Johnson,
294 Mo. 461, 243 S. W. 123 (1922). Contra: Wray v. Wray, 159 Iowa 230,
140 N. W. 414 (1913); J. A. Jones Const. Co. v. Hamlet Ice Co., 190 N. C.
580, 130 S. E. 165 (1925).
Corn v. Suderov, 160 App. Div. 916, 145 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st Dep't
1914); Strother v. Morrison, 100 W. Va. 5, 130 S. E. 255 (1925); Himler
Coal Co. v. Kirk, 210 Ky. 28, 275 S. W. 371 (1925).
29 For a collection of statutes making compulsory the use of a counter-
claim arising out of the same transaction. see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928)
446, n. 48.
3 0 Sloan v. McDowell, supra note 14; Caine v. Seattle & Northern Ry.,
12 Wash. 596, 41 Pac. 904 (1895); Schmidt v. Posner, 130 Iowa 347, 106
N. W. 760 (1906).
S1 Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard, 122 Misc. 760, 204 N. Y. Supp. 31
(4th Dep't 1924); Benson v. Fulmore, 269 S. W. 71 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925). But cf. National Metal Edge Box Co. v. American Metal Edge Box
Co.; 246 Pa. 78, 92 Atl. 42 (1914).
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advantages may be made available by the second action. The
same power to dismiss the prior action exists. It would there-
fore seem that the court should rule on a motion to stay the
counterclaim exactly as it would pass on a motion to stay the
second of two suits brought by the same plaintiff.
In view of the varying situations in which a foreign action
may be pleaded and the diverse considerations which should in-
fluence the decision of the court, it would seem most desirable
that a discretionary power to stay be substituted for the existent
rule of thumb whereby a plea in abatement is arbitrarily over-
ruled. Until pleaders abandon the apparently crystallized habit
of raising the issue by demurrer or plea, the initiative in effect-
ing such a change must come from the courts. It may be
doubted whether a court might adopt the practice of granting
a stay before the withdrawal of a plea in abatement previously
filed. Yet it certainly lies within the power of a court to attain
the desired result by suggesting to counsel that the plea be re-
placed by a motion to stay, and by subsequent discretionary
action on the motion in accord with the pertinent factors of the
particular case.
EVol. 391202
